The OSHA ergonomics standard issued in 2000 was repealed within four months through a Congressional resolution that limits future ergonomics rulemaking. This section continues the conversation initiated in Part I, documenting a legacy of struggle for an ergonomics standard through the voices of eight labor, academic, and government key informants. Part I summarized important components of the standard; described the convergence of labor activism, research, and government action that laid the foundation for a standard; and highlighted the debates that characterized the rulemaking process. Part II explores the anti-regulatory political landscape of the 1990s, as well as the key opponents, power dynamics, and legal maneuvers that led to repeal of the standard. This section also describes the impact of the ergonomics struggle beyond the standard itself and ends with a discussion of creative state-level policy initiatives and coalition approaches to prevent work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs) in today's sociopolitical context.
be done in them and what doesn't, and don't appreciate any outside interference that they haven't personally invited in. They wanted guidelines rather than standards. But they wanted something that they could really use, and the smaller employers were the ones who were up in arms with great ferocity. It looked like it was going to be shut down, that the industry sectors were just coming unglued.
PUNNETT: I was at the New York COSH [Council for Occupational Safety and Health] office just after the draft standard was published in the Federal Register and saw a faxed document that I think the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had prepared in advance, a fill-in-the-blank pre-printed form letter, saying, I am a business owner. My business is fill-in-the-blank. I employ fill-in-the-blank number of employees. I am opposed to the OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] standard on ergonomics because . . . , and then you could check off as many pre-printed reasons as you liked. These were ready to go on the day the standard went into the Federal Register. They sent this out to every single one of their members nationwide, telling them send this back, it's really important. You have to help hold the line here. It didn't matter what the standard said. They were ready with their opposition in that moment. They didn't even wait and read the standard and then decide what should be in this fax. Then there was the National Coalition on Ergonomics. All the big companies put money into that to generate all the public comment back to OSHA and paid for these fancy lawyers to go to the OSHA hearings. All those things that Barbara had thought so carefully about, the hope was that they would help to reduce the political opposition. None of those things made a difference. B. SILVERSTEIN: They [the industry] had all kinds of ideas about what was in it [the standard]. They hadn't seen it yet, but they wanted it stopped. So it looked like OSHA and Bob Reich were all going to just cave because the pressure was just too great against it. So I released the checklist and some of the background materials on the Internet and got on my rollerblades and rollerbladed around downtown D.C. for a while, while this was all happening, so nobody could reach me to stop it. That checklist is still being used . . . when I go to other countries, particularly industrially developing countries, people have the checklist and are using it. SEMINARIO: During the rulemaking and political fight, a whole lot of folks participated, were brought in as expert witnesses, but there were other groups and folks who were very engaged in working on this. It was a broad-based group of people, a very broad coalition of people engaged in this fight. I would say the unions led a lot of the work, but it was not something that was done in isolation or without a broad engagement across the health and safety community, involving many safety and health professionals.
B. SILVERSTEIN:
Most of the labor unions were very actively involved. The UFCW [United Food and Commercial Workers] was very involved and the AFL was supportive. Peg did a great job. Teamsters were supportive. The unions were supportive of this. But I think that we didn't do a good enough job in really talking about how to reduce the risks in a way that wasn't going to put their employers out of business. . . . I think that we expected labor would just support this and not that their members would be worried about their jobs and therefore, what their employers are telling them about that they'll go out of business if this thing is passed and they have to adhere to it. I think that's an important issue for the future.
NS: This process seems particularly contentious. As you mentioned, unions were very active in the 1970s and 1980s. . . . They were making strides in rulemaking. Then in the mid-1990s under Newt Gingrich things started to change? SEMINARIO: Yes. Overnight. The Republicans had not been in control of the Congress for 40 years. They came in with an agenda. Top of the agenda was anti-regulatory activity. Part of it was the timing. This was a big rule moving forward at the very time when you had just a massive tectonic shift in the politics in the country and in the political leadership in Congress.
M. SILVERSTEIN:
Peg is absolutely right. I would identify three reasons why ergonomics, especially in the mid-'90s, became so contentious, so incredibly contentious. The first is that the approach taken impacted virtually all industries. In the early days, before the proposed rule was published, construction was certainly under discussion. It was very broad so it drew opposition from everyplace.
The second reason is the hazards that are addressed in dealing with musculoskeletal disorders are defined by the way job tasks are designed and assigned. The issue gets very close to control over the means of production and touches on the sensitivity of management to their prerogatives. So, it's a very fundamental set of issues about labor relations.
Then the third reason, as Peg just said, is that in 1994 when the 104th Congress was put in place and Newt Gingrich released his "Contract with America" [2] , deregulation was one of the central pieces in it. The ergonomics issue became symbolic for the business campaign against government regulation. Once an issue becomes symbolic, it escapes all boundaries of rational discussion. So, overnight it became a much hotter issue, but it also became an irrational and intractable battle.
Anti-Regulatory Political Atmosphere
MIRER: There were all kinds of anti-regulatory regulations being proposed in Congress; it was a severe counterattack and very successful, I think. I don't think the ergonomics proceeding was more contentious than some of the previous ones, formaldehyde and lead in particular. But, what was perhaps different was the great difficulty in getting OSHA to get to the point of issuing a proposal and scheduling hearings.
SEMINARIO:
A big part of the delay was due to Congressional appropriations riders that prohibited OSHA from developing or issuing the rule. The first attempt to block the rule came in March 1995, right after the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives, when the House passed a budget rescission bill that prohibited OSHA from developing or promulgating a proposed rule on ergonomics. A compromise that passed in July 1995 prohibited OSHA from issuing, but not from working on, the ergonomics standard. Then in 1997, Republicans took a different approach, trying to prohibit OSHA from issuing an ergonomics standard until the National Academy of Sciences completed a study on the scientific basis of ergonomics. Ergonomics was at such a heightened place that at one point it was one of two issues remaining in reaching agreement between the Congress and the Clinton administration on a funding bill for the entire government [3] . I think what was agreed to that year was that an NAS [National Academy of Sciences] study would have to be conducted before any ergonomics rule could be issued, but that OSHA was allowed to continue to work on the rule. It became such a symbolic issue, but such a priority for the other side as well as a priority for us. So, it really took on a level of political importance between not only the unions and the industry, but also the administration and the Republicans in Congress.
M. SILVERSTEIN:
There's another part of the story, which is why OSHA and the Department of Labor were so slow in moving in the very first years of Clinton's first term [before the Republicans became a majority in 1995]. I think in retrospect that if Secretary of Labor Bob Reich had been willing to move ahead with issuing an ergonomics rule proposal in the first couple of years of Clinton's first term, then the dynamics would have been different.
SEMINARIO:
During the early years of the Clinton administration there was a major focus at OSHA on reinventing government, getting away from enforcement and getting into voluntary compliance and partnerships. Secretary Reich believed if the government just showed the employer the right way, they would do the right thing. So, there weren't a lot of regulations being developed on anything at OSHA at that point in time.
M. SILVERSTEIN:
Peg Seminario is right but, unfortunately in retrospect, we made a very fundamental strategic mistake in OSHA during that time which had a big impact on OSHA's reluctance to move ahead with ergonomics. We decided to make a big push on regulating indoor air quality and secondhand tobacco smoke before ergonomics. That generated huge business pressure in opposition to OSHA and raised the profile of OSHA's rulemaking as a political battleground. This really scared Bob Reich away from any controversial OSHA rulemaking, ergonomics in particular, because it reminded him of his prior experience at the Federal Trade Commission when a proposed rule on television advertising went so horribly downhill that it threatened the very existence of the FTC itself. The FTC had been branded as the "public nanny" and he did not want to risk going through that again.
B. SILVERSTEIN:
We went in to talk about the ergonomics rule because it was already getting a lot of publicity before it even became anything. And Bob Reich turns to me and sort of incredulously says, "Do you want the entire business community in the United States to come down on our heads?" And I said, "No, I want them to do the right thing by their employees."
JEFFRESS:
It was not popular initially with the safety and health folks who didn't trust employers or OSHA to properly assess problems. It certainly wasn't popular with employers who feared that OSHA would second-guess their judgment as to what was reasonable to do given their experiences. It was really a tough sell to push that concept. I think one of the reasons why Congress rejected it was that the employer community had no confidence that OSHA would apply it in a reasonable way.
RABINOWITZ:
To some extent they [OSHA] were a little constrained and always fearful that Congress was going to shut them down in the appropriations process and stop them from moving forward. It was a realistic fear and so in part the proposal was geared towards assuaging people's concerns that this was going to be unreasonable. And then Congress invalidated the rule. They sort of blindsided everybody.
Congressional Review Act of 1996

NS: The Congressional Review Act, used to overturn the ergonomics standard, was part of the whole package the Republicans brought to Congress under the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 [4]. Could you expand on how it was used to repeal the standard?
RABINOWITZ: The Congressional Review Act provides a quick procedural track for Congress to invalidate a regulation. When OSHA issues a rule, they exercise authority, legislative authority that was delegated to them. So it's always Congress's authority to take back. But to do so, both the House and the Senate have established procedures for considering bills, and these include having Committees consider and amend the legislation. The Congressional Review Act is essentially a fast-track procedure; it goes very quickly for a vote, up-or-down vote. No amendments are permitted. And so it just gets rushed through. In the case of ergonomics, my recollection is it was introduced and voted on very quickly. The business community had lined these votes up very quietly.
And once it's signed, it says that OSHA may never issue a substantially similar standard to the one that was withdrawn. So it not only invalidates the ergo standard that was the subject of the Congressional Review Act action but it limits OSHA's ability to move forward in a "substantially similar manner." The ergo [standard] is the only time Congress has ever exercised its authority under the Congressional Review Act so we have no precedent to tell us what it means to limit OSHA from regulating in a substantially similar manner. If OSHA were to try and move forward on ergo, there's this huge question mark sitting there.
SEMINARIO:
The only reason that it [the Congressional Review Act (CRA)] was successful on ergonomics was because of the timing of the [ergo] rule and the political alignment that existed when this rule come out. The final standard was issued by the Clinton administration in November 2000. But when President [George W.] Bush took office in January 2001, it was still within the window of possibility for review by the Congress. Had Al Gore been elected, the rule would have stood, because it is unlikely that there would have been attempts to use the CRA, and even if the Congress overturned the rule, the resolution of disapproval would have been vetoed by a Democratic president.
The argument that industry and those who voted to overturn the rule made was that they weren't opposed to any ergonomic standard, just this ergonomic standard. They claimed that the rule was too ill-defined. It was too far-reaching. It interfered with worker's compensation, all of that. There was a huge press by the industry to get the rule overturned.
The whole thing was brutal. It was just so fast. So, it was such an extreme action that it was the only time that law had ever been used successfully. What that did, in terms of OSHA politically, emotionally, was devastating. The agency had [invested] a huge amount of time and energy into this rule, and all of us had as well.
WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THIS STRUGGLE?
In this section, we examine the impact of the struggle to improve working conditions and protect workers from WMSDs, despite the lack of success in upholding an ergonomics standard.
Impact on Working Conditions
NS: The UFCW and other unions invested considerable amounts of energy in changing working conditions in the years leading up to rulemaking as well as in the '90s. What was the impact of these debates, the aftermath of this struggle? NOWELL: We really did change the meatpacking industry. It was not for naught that we went through this. The meatpacking guidelines issued in 1990, that came out of the huge OSHA citations and settlement agreements, led to early diagnosis and treatment of injuries so workers weren't permanently disabled. And they led to light-duty jobs. Tools were redesigned as early as the '80s when Tom Armstrong of the University of Michigan ergonomist team, together with the union, convinced a turkey-processing plant to let him in.
Since then, I've looked at the meatpacking industry and said, "what a difference we've made." The meat industry totally innovated to automate some of the really hand-intensive jobs. We know they did it mostly because it made economic sense but they had to cut down those numbers [of injuries]. They had to take care of the workforce. It's a skilled workforce in meatpacking and they needed to survive. I see [the industry] today as very different because of this. Because we have so much union density, I feel like I have a handle on the issues and things are way better.
We also had an impact on the way OSHA conducted their inspections. The notorious cases of falsified injury and illness record keeping in the '80s highlighted the problem with OSHA exempting from inspection those industries with rates below the industry average. That was an incentive for them not to record things like carpal tunnel [syndrome], which were not easily identified by looking. And it led to a change in policy so OSHA could cite and fine for each instance of violation; every falsified record could be fined and if there were hundreds of worker injuries not recorded on the OSHA Log, that led to a huge fine. That was a major change that made the industry pay attention.
Impact on Research
NS: What was the impact on research?
PUNNETT: The word "ergonomics" [in research proposals] was like the kiss of death for a while. I don't think that's true anymore. One positive part of this whole long saga was that gaps in the literature were identified. We need more intervention studies. We need more longitudinal studies. We need to try to homogenize the exposure measures and the outcome definitions, which still hasn't happened so much. Those kinds of issues got onto the research agenda in a more systemic way. That was a good thing. I wish it hadn't happened in that way, but it called attention to the need to add to certain parts of the literature in a way that would strengthen the evidence for future legal cases, at least in other countries, if not in the U.S.
NS: There has been debate about whether WMSDs should be recorded in a separate column on the OSHA Log. That has implications for data collection and identifying where there are problems. Do any of you have any comments or analysis about why that is happening? SEMINARIO: It's a continuation of the fight. Industry decided that they wanted to stop any kind of action that addressed ergonomics-record keeping, guidelines or voluntary standards. So after the ergonomics rule was repealed, they continued going after record keeping on musculoskeletal disorders. The record-keeping rule had been finalized by the Clinton administration in January 2001. It included a separate column for identifying which injuries and illnesses were WMSDs. When the Bush administration took office, they stopped the new record-keeping rule and then removed the WMSD column. There were efforts under the Obama Administration to reinstate the column, and that got hung up, unfortunately in a similar way, with the election of a Republican House of Representatives in 2010, then later at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Obama Administration got cold feet about doing any kind of regulations and withdrew the draft rule from OMB review. Then Congress moved to include a rider prohibiting OSHA from issuing a rule to reinstate the column. It was 1995 revisited, maybe on a smaller scale.
M. SILVERSTEIN:
It does show that industry has maintained a scorched earth strategy with regard to anything that comes close to ergonomics. That only happens when an issue, as we were talking about earlier, is very ideological and symbolic.
Action at State Level
NS: Mike, you described in an AJIM [American Journal of Industrial Medicine] article what happened in the political arena in Washington State
to defeat the standard there [5] . That leaves only the California Repetitive Motion Injury Prevention standard still standing [6] . And that one is constrained by an injury trigger, requiring employer action only when two workers doing identical job tasks report RMIs [repetitive motion injuries] within a one-year period. What's your assessment of action at the state level? M. SILVERSTEIN: There have been a few false starts and maybe a couple of sputtering candles, but that's it-and work-related musculoskeletal disorders remain at a level of about 30 to 40 percent of all worker compensation claims and probably 50 percent of all worker compensation costs.
NS: There has been some positive movement on safe patient handling, 1 to address the high rates of WMSDs in health care.
B. SILVERSTEIN:
We've had a safe patient handling standard for hospitals in Washington State since 2006. It passed unanimously in the State House and Senate because there were four nurses in the House and four in the Senate. Washington is limited in that only hospitals are included in our legislation. But Minnesota went top-to-bottom in health care. I think, by having 10 states that have safe patient handling legislation, it may make it possible to move forward with safe patient handling on the national level.
The Washington safe patient handling steering committee includes representatives from the major hospitals and four different unions. We've been evaluating its implementation and sustainability, looking at the differences prior to the legislation being enacted and doing long-term follow-up with the hospitals. We're using nursing homes as a comparison group. The nursing home industry in Washington State is totally opposed to any regulation. They say they're the second most regulated industry in America after nuclear power. That's their line. So, we've been comparing rates for acute care hospitals with rates for other health care sectors. The incidence rates for nursing homes are increasing pretty steadily, whereas the incidence rates for hospitals decreased for about four years, particularly for the back and shoulder, and then they have been pretty steady. You've got this perfect storm about to happen in the next five years; we've got both an increase in age and obesity for patients, and we have the same thing for staff. We'll see injury rates skyrocket, especially in home care. I do hope that OSHA's planning to use the general duty clause to really go after some bad actors in health care. That's a possibility when you don't have any national [ergonomics] standards.
NS: What about any other creative or alternative approaches at the state level?
B. SILVERSTEIN: In Washington State we're looking at subsectors of industries with really high workers' comp claims rates for musculoskeletal disorders, and then within that subsector, looking at companies with high and low claims rates that are the same size. And we're interviewing employers and workers, and collecting work organization information, as well as detailed physical exposure assessments. We're using six different checklists to see which, if any, are related to the difference between high lost-time claims [rate] and low lost-time claims rate companies. And we're also interviewing labor and management safety committee members because in Washington State, if you have more than 10 employees, you have to have a committee. Then we'll develop guidelines or recommendations based on best practices that we've seen in their companies, and get that information out to each industry sector. We're also comparing workers' comp outcomes for permanent and temporary workers doing essentially the same work.
THE FUTURE
NS: Now that Congress has disapproved this rule, do you think any form of ergo standard is possible to achieve on a federal level or will it require a whole new Congress to pass something related to ergonomic standards on a national scale? Is it even possible to achieve something on a federal level at this point? We saw how critical the role of unions was in the '80s and, in today's climate, union density has declined considerably.
Political Possibilities
RABINOWITZ: I don't think you're going to see anything. That's my prognosis. I think it's too much of a hot potato. Any OSHA official, either federal or state, would have to consider whether it's important to use OSHA's limited resources on something where you had limited confidence it would make a lasting impact when there were other things you could do that would be less controversial and might end up on the books. That is a reasonable choice to make.
SEMINARIO:
Not broadly on ergonomics, no. . . . I think it might be possible and I think the first area that has the most potential would be a federal rule on safe patient handling.
M. SILVERSTEIN: I agree.
That's what's happened in the state of Washington. Ergonomics continues to have a bad name with industry across the board, but safe patient handling legislation passed with industry support. That could happen at the federal level. But do you think, Peg, that even the safe patient handling is possible without a substantial restructuring of Congress? SEMINARIO: It might be. . . . I think that it could be done without people thinking that it's ergonomics, but doing any big rule, regardless of what it's about, is hard politically. . . . It's not like any regulations are moving forward. We're back into the anti-regulatory times. So, I would say, it's much harder to put out big regulations now than it was, actually, in the mid-'90s.
B. SILVERSTEIN:
The nurses unions have been going to Congress trying to get safe patient handling through, and now a committee has taken it up. I don't think the hospital association would oppose it. Who would oppose it is the nursing home association. If we could get it nationally for hospitals, we ought to be able to start moving to the rest of health care after that.
PUNNETT: I think there have to be really different strategies to move forward now with ergonomics protection on a meaningful scale. I agree about putting effort into safe patient handling initiatives, which seem to have traction in a number of states. Yet at the same time when I look at the arguing with the USDA [U.S. Dept. of Agriculture] about the proposal to speed up the lines in poultry processing operations [7] , and the apparent inability of a public health argument to have any influence, it's pretty discouraging. Part of what's different about the safe patient-handling topic is that you can engage people about the quality of care and the desire to protect good caregivers. You can make a case in the court of public opinion because a lot of people have direct experience with health care. But sadly that doesn't generalize to many other types of jobs where people are getting hurt but they aren't as visible to the general public.
M. SILVERSTEIN:
Almost 15 years later, the term ergonomics remains a highly pejorative term, and the symbolic power of it in these battles about the role of federal government and its regulatory power remains pretty intense.
SEMINARIO: There were some immediate window-dressing, face-saving actions by the Bush administration after the ergonomics standard was repealed. They put in place an advisory committee, a few enforcement actions, but then that petered out. Under the Obama administration, there really has been no effort to look at how to reengage on this. That is as much a function of the fact that the unions are much weaker now.
JEFFRESS: OSHA will never be able to keep up with the standard-setting process it has with the changes in modern industrial life or construction life or any other kinds of work life. We still have on the books electrical standards from 1971 requiring employers to use electrical equipment that isn't even available anymore, you know? The problems with updating standards to keep current are so cumbersome that OSHA simply cannot keep up. . . . There are a lot of industrial safety and health people who firmly believe that the OSHA standards are just a bare minimum and hardly worth considering. The private sector keeps much more current on best practices. They're not enforceable standards, but they are best practices. They're not as comprehensive as OSHA standards, but where they exist they're better. . . . So, I think there actually is a core of safety and health folks in the business community that with the right conversation could help direct us towards a different approach.
Again, my experience is shaped by 20 years in a state labor department in North Carolina, which is one of the five lowest [states] in terms of union organization in the country, I would imagine. In a non-union environment, trying to be the safety and health cop for a state of 6 million people with maybe a hundred inspectors, it doesn't work.
If OSHA's going to succeed with making any kind of dramatic leaps forward in, say, healthy workplaces, it's going to have to go to the performance route. I would be curious about sitting down with the safety and health community generally, employers, union groups, and activist groups, and seeing if a grand bargain could be reached where all of the prescriptive standards are eliminated, just get thousands of pages of regulations off the books and replace them with a safety and health program standard that says essentially the tack we tried to take with ergonomics, which is it's the employer's responsibility to provide healthy and safe workplaces.
SEMINARIO:
Another approach from the past couple years has potential for helping to address these issues. In health care, the Center for Medicaid Services (CMS) got very interested in these issues because they are increasing the cost of health care. If there was more focus on health care costs, there might be more effort to impart some ergo provisions through other forces with more authority and clout than OSHA.
NOWELL:
Rather than concentrating on an ergo standard, the fight is to organize. If there is a standard, it almost has to be a warehouse standard, a manufacturing standard, an agricultural standard; and that would take too long. We know how people get hurt, so address it. The fight is to have people be organized. Workers need a voice in the workplace and from that voice they will make management do what they are supposed to do. The answer is not OSHA. They have a place but the answer is labor, and organizing workers. That's the way to change these jobs.
Advice for Young Health Professionals and Health Activists
NS: What advice would give to young health and safety professionals or activists at this point and in today's context?
MIRER: For health and safety professionals or those training to be professionals, most of these jobs are going to be in industries like health care, education, maybe to some degree in transportation. It's possible and necessary to do an ergonomics program in a hospital and, at some level, in nursing homes. It's a value to learn how to do a risk assessment, a quantitative, semi-quantitative risk assessment for a particular job. For activists, I think the issue is suppression of injury reporting and threats and intimidation against workers, which again is the way to maybe revive this issue at some point in the future, particularly at the workplace or the industry level, although not probably at the national level.
PUNNETT:
We're still teaching the basics of ergonomics job analysis and redesign in our training program, and our students want those skills. While there are not many jobs for full-time ergonomists in private industry, practitioners with broad responsibility for occupational and environment health and safety need to know how to address ergonomics problems. But I've also tried to find other ways to raise these issues. For example, the discussion about socioeconomic disparities in health: in most of the public health literature, the mechanisms that get discussed are income and lifestyle, but almost nobody mentions working conditions as a mediator, which is ridiculous to those of us who know anything about occupational health and safety. Because people spend more waking hours at work than they do anywhere else, if they're lucky enough to have a job. And we know that people at the bottom have much worse working conditions than people at the top of the totem pole. So, there's a way to engage in a mainstream public health discussion but use examples from the ergonomic and psychosocial features of work and talk about their contributions to socioeconomic disparities in health.
I've taken a similar strategic approach with the NIOSH [National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health] Total Worker Health program, which is to talk about the impact of work organization and job stress on people's health behaviors: the fact that people in physically and psychosocially more stressful jobs are much more likely to not exercise after work, smoke more, have more trouble stopping smoking, be overweight. It's not hard to picture that when you're on your feet all day and you have no decision-making latitude and you're stressed and tired when you go home, you'd much rather sit on the couch and watch television than go for a run. And even worse, of course, if you're a single parent with little kids and have no time for yourself. So those are the kinds of strategies to pursue, looking for other openings to raise the issue of occupational ergonomics within public health.
SEMINARIO:
There is a lot of political and organizing work going on right now to try and stop this bad USDA rule in poultry processing [8] . The activism comes out of the immigrant community and the Latino community and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) is one of the main forces. NCLR got very involved with this rule and has been doing a lot of great work on the ground with coalitions, with other groups concerned about food safety and contamination in poultry, but [their efforts] are around working conditions, basically around ergonomics. There is potential for activism, but it has to be combined with other issues that are going forward, issues that are critical for an abused workforce. M. SILVERSTEIN: I attended the last National Council for Occupational Safety and Health meeting and was very moved by the level of activism and the kind of resurgence in interest in work-related injuries and illnesses among young activists. There were the COSH groups, worker centers, immigrant rights organizations-there is a tremendous amount of energy that could potentially be devoted to the prevention of musculoskeletal disorders once again, after a number of years in which things trailed off a bit.
I would just encourage younger people who are looking at the workplace to think hard about where the injuries and the costs of injuries are; any rational analysis leads you to ergonomics. I think that new strategies are required, and I was encouraged by the creativity and willingness to look at old issues in a fresh way. I don't know what to do next, but I think there are young people who are coming up in the ranks who are capable of figuring this out.
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